We analyze the wage effects of employment breaks of women entering motherhood using a novel within-firm matching approach where mothers' wages upon return to the job are compared with those of their female colleagues. We investigate three different matching procedures: (1) exact matching on individual characteristics two years before birth, (2) propensity score matching and (3) a combined procedure of exact and propensity score matching. In a subsequent regression analysis on the wage differences of the matched pairs we find heterogeneous treatment effects. Our results yield new insights into the nature of the wage penalty associated with motherhood.
Introduction
It is an empirical fact that, on average, mothers have lower wage rates than women without children. This wage penalty or 'family gap' has been found mainly in the United States (see recent evidence by Budig and England 2001 , Lundberg and Rose 2000 , Waldfogel 1998a ) and in the United Kingdom (Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel 1999, Waldfogel, 1998b) . Lower wages of mothers may be caused by career intermittence due to child birth and child rearing, but also by a reduced attachment to the labor market, hence, a decrease in effort of mothers working. Another prominent source for pay differences is the occupational segregation of mothers-to-be into lower paying jobs or establishments with family-friendly job or firm characteristics. As the underlying effects are manifold and complex, the size of the causal wage losses due to motherhood is difficult to measure. Therefore we examine the backlog of mothers' wage rates caused by maternity and parental leave breaks using a novel within-firm-semiparametric approach based on matching. That is, we match each mother who experienced an employment break with a non-mother colleague of the same firm. Due to within-firm matching, unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be fully taken into account. The individual heterogeneity in the treatment effect is investigated in a subsequent regression analysis of the wage differences between the matched pairs.
Germany is known as one of the countries with the most extensive parental leave legislation, comprising a mother protection period and a parental leave period of up to 3 years. During the mother protection period, women are prohibited to work for a period of six weeks before the expected birth of the baby and another eight weeks after childbirth. Since 1992 Since (1993 , the subsequent parental leave period may last a maximum of 3 years whereof 18 months (24 months) may be accompanied by parental leave benefits. During the whole period, the leave taker's job is protected against dismissal. Although both parents are eligible for the leave and parents are allowed to switch the leave taker several times, 98 percent of those on leave are women. In 2000 only 53 percent of mothers in West Germany and 70 percent in East Germany were re-employed right after the formal leave period (Beckman and Kurtz 2001) . The wage effects of such career interruptions have been found to be substantial in Germany (see estimations by Beblo and Wolf 2002a and 2002b , Ejrnaes and Kunze 2004 , Kunze 2002 and Ondrich, Spiess and Yang 2001 . Though, none of these studies has applied an evaluation approach -neither to estimate the wage backlogs of mothers relative to comparable non-mothers, nor to assess the differences between colleagues within the same firm.
The challenge of our research question is to determine what the wage rate of a mother would be if she had not given birth and experienced an employment break within a specific observation period.
Since this counterfactual outcome is not observable, we have to identify a control group of females without children which is comparable to our selection of females giving birth with respect to the distribution of all variables that affect the wage determination process. A perfect counterpart for a mother would be a childless female colleague who works in the same company, in a comparable job, is of comparable age, has the same career path, achieved the same educational level and exhibits the same unobservable characteristics -such as ability or motivation -potentially affecting the wage rate. As such an ideal counterpart is difficult to find, we propose three alternative matching procedures to determine a useful control group. In all three cases we compare women entering motherhood (mothers) and women not giving birth in the observation period (nonmothers) within the same firm to accommodate firm segregation and unobserved firm-specific effects. Furthermore, we apply matching procedures that produce exact matches with respect to the working time status and occupation of the women. These matching procedures take into account that, following Polachek (1981) mothers-to-be may be less attached to the labor market on average and therefore choose jobs or occupations with rather flat experience profiles but smaller expected wage cuts due to discontinuous employment patterns. This way, our matching is meant to control for observable and unobservable features of mothers-to-be and their employers.
Once the control groups are determined we compare the wage rates of mothers and non-mothers before and after the mothers' employment break. We have information on wages right upon return as well as 6 months, 12 months and 24 months after the end of the break. These dates are dynamically determined by the duration of the interruption chosen by the mother. We compare her wage rate with that of the respective (set of) control colleagues who is (are) observed working in the same firm and on the same effective days. The mean difference in wages reflects the average treatment-on-the-treated effect of entering motherhood and experiencing a specific employment break. The individual treatment effects, however, may differ across women due to heterogeneity in the duration of the employment interruption and other individual characteristics of the mother and the firm. In a regression analysis we therefore investigate the determinants of the difference in the wage rates using duration of the employment break and other characteristics of mothers and their employers as explanatory variables.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our methodological approach in more detail. The data is described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results of the alternative matching procedures and the second-step wage gap analyses. The last section concludes and discusses potential extensions of our approach.
Our evaluation approach
The goal of this paper is to determine the average treatment-on-the-treated effect (ATT) on the wage rate, that is the average expected effect of becoming a mother and experiencing an employment break for all employed mothers-to-be. We follow Rubin (1974) and identify the causal effect of the "treatment" by comparing the wage rate of a mother after her parental leave period with the hypothetical situation of the same woman if she had not entered the stage of motherhood.
Let Y 1 denote the wage rate of mothers after returning to their former employer and let Y 0 denote the wage rate of women who did not interrupt their career due to child bearing. Let D be an indicator variable which equals one if a women experienced a parental leave employment break and equals zero if not. Then, the ATT is given by:
Since the hypothetical situation 0 (1) EYD = cannot be observed for mothers, we have to find alternative ways to estimate the average wage of mothers with parental leave experience if they were continuously employed. According to Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2003) , two alternative approaches may be applied to estimate the average non-treatment outcome, that is the wage rate of continuously employed non-mother: (i) a before-after comparison of mothers or (ii) a comparison with a control group of non-mothers. The first approach assumes a constant average non-treatment outcome over time for the treated. In other words, this approach requires that mothers would have experienced a constant wage rate, had they remained childless. This assumption does not hold, e.g. if the women would have been promoted otherwise, if their wage scales are tenure based or if macroeconomic shocks have taken place. Another fundamental problem which applies to both approaches, is the potential selection bias which occurs if mothers differ from both, mothers-to-be and non-mothers, due to observable and unobservable characteristics. Due to these selection effects, the wage levels of mothers and non-mothers may be different before the treatment already -for whatever reason. In this case, neither a simple crosssection regression of wages depending on past parental leave experience nor a before-after comparison would yield unbiased results. Hence, the definition of an appropriate control group must be chosen very carefully. We will now briefly discuss some approaches to control for selection on observable and unobservable characteristics.
Controlling for selection on observable characteristics
To account for differences in observable characteristics, we refer to the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). Under CIA, it does not matter whether we estimate the average outcome of continuous employment based on information about mothers or non-mothers provided that they have similar observable characteristics.
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(1,)(0,) EYDXEYDX === It is therefore important to carefully chose the set of observable characteristics. Basically, () X should include the wages before treatment and all wage determining characteristics. But when is the appropriate point in time to compare the differences between mothers and nonmothers? Of course, the definition of the control group should be based on information before the observed career intermittence of mothers. Considering that becoming pregnant is not a fully exogenous event and mothers-to-be may be more likely to substitute money for flexible working conditions (which are difficult to observe in general), we should compare mothers-to-be and nonmothers with respect to their wage rate and all wage determining characteristics when the employment break is not yet a certain event. According to Ejrnaes and Kunze (2004) , wages of mothers-to-be start declining 1 to 2 years before child birth. We therefore define our first observation point 12 months before conception, respectively 22 month before birth. Figure 1 illustrates the time frame of our evaluation approach. At t 0 , the mother gives birth to her child. To account for differences of women with and without maternity leave breaks, we match mothers and non-mothers at time t -1 , assuming that the future pregnancy has not been anticipated yet, at least not in a way related to wages or wage-determining characteristics. The employment break due to motherhood lasts from t 0 to t +1 and differs between individuals. At t +1, the mother returns to her former employer 1 : t +1, just as t +2 , t +3 and t +4 are alternative observation points for wage comparisons with the mother's female colleagues (i.e. her matching partners) who are -still or again -working at the same firm. The return to the job is defined as an employment spell of at least 3 months length. 2 We are aware that this set-up gives rise to yet another source of selection bias since the analysis is based on a comparison of firm-stayers only, as regards both mothers and control observations. We are planning to perform sensitivity analyses including also firm-movers to assess the potential bias associated with our selective sample. 
Controlling for selection on unobservable characteristics
Given that the fertility choice is very complex, the correction of the selection bias based on observable characteristics might not be sufficient to yield a consistent estimate of the ATT effect, because unobservable characteristics may be of significant importance. On one hand, women with a preference for raising children may anticipate their non-employment spells and hence are less willing to invest in their human capital, taking into account that the "resource time" of this investment may be very limited. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that women whose career has come to a halt for some reason are more likely to choose motherhood as a kind of fallback way of life than ambitious and up-and-coming women who have found full satisfaction in their work life. This being, the underlying mechanisms affecting fertility and subsequent parental leave spells are not fully observable to us.
Provided that the selection effect due to unobservables is time-invariant and linear, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) propose the difference-in-difference-estimator (DiD) to yield unbiased results. This estimator extends the simple before-after comparison by contrasting the before-after difference in wage rates of mothers to the wage change of non-mothers within the same observation period. According to Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998) , the DiD estimator combined with non-parametric matching, the so-called "conditional difference-in-differenceestimator", proves very useful in controlling for selection on observed and unobserved characteristics. In the final version of this paper, we will therefore apply the conditional DiD estimator if selection on unobservables seems important. 
Definition of the control group
The challenge with the measurement of the ATT is to determine the wage rate of a mother if she had not given birth to a child and interrupted her employment career for this reason. Given that this hypothetical outcome is not observable, we have to identify a control group of non-mothers which is comparable to the mothers with respect to the distribution of all variables which affect the wage determination process. A perfect counterpart for a mother would therefore be a female colleague with no kids who works in the same company in a comparable job, has about the same age, has experienced a comparable past career path, achieved the same educational level and exhibits the same unobservable characteristics potentially affecting the wage rate. It is obvious that the ideal counterpart is difficult to find, even if we had full information on all female colleagues.
Hence, we propose three feasible alternatives to determine a useful control group.
The most straightforward method of matching, that is exact matching, compares persons with exactly the same values of observed characteristics X . Note that this method works only with a limited number of discrete X -variables. The choice of the relevant X -variables is delicate, because it is subject to a trade-off denoted as the "curse of dimensionality". The higher the number of variables selected and the larger the range of values these variables may take, the lower is the probability to find an exact match. But, the lower the number of selected variables and the less values these variables may take, the more vague is the match, that is, the more unequal are the matched pairs.
For our first matching procedure we decided to select "exact" matches with respect to the establishment, occupation (80 categories), age (with a maximum deviation of 5 years), education (3 categories), working time status (full/part time) and daily gross earnings (with a maximum deviation of 20 percent). The information which enters the matching procedure refers to t -1 in Figure 1 which is 22 months before entering motherhood. We denote this procedure as MATCH 1.
Exact matching with respect to establishment guaranties that the treated and untreated women underlie the same unobserved fixed effect affecting the wage determination process within the establishment. Matching on education and occupation is meant to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity affecting the occupational choice in the sense of Polachek (1981) . By conditioning on age we try to account for employment experience (this information, as well as information on the incidence of past employment interruptions, will be included as separate stratification variables in the future) and different stages in the life cycle associated with the likelihood of maternity. Education levels and working time serve to make daily wages comparable.
Since there were still a considerable number of controls for most treated observations, we further accounted for differences in hourly wage rates one year before conception. The quality of this matching procedure and the percentage of treated observations with an appropriate control and the average number of control observations -conditional on finding at least one control -is discussed in Section 4.1.
Due to the curse of dimensionality, exact matching is not capable of providing an appropriate control in all dimensions and for all mothers. We therefore use an inexact matching procedure in the second application (MATCH 2). Propensity score matching reduces the dimension problem by defining a distance metric on X and subsequent matching is based on the distance metric rather than the X . Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) illustrate, that the distance metric may be defined as:
3 Hence, we estimate a parametric probit model to predict the individual propensity score () PX . The next issue we have to deal with is the choice of the appropriate matching algorithm. The most common form is the nearest neighbor matching (NNM) selecting one or more untreated observations whose () PX is closest to that of the mother. A very appealing alternative which makes use of all potential comparison observations, hence holding variance low, is kernel matching (KM).
Given that the number of comparison observations is small for some mothers -namely those working in small establishments (see Table 1 ) -we try both matching algorithms. First, we apply NNM with replacement in order to keep the bias small. As the choice of the number of nearest neighbors is subject to a trade off between bias and variance, we choose one neighbor, being aware that the variance may be high. Note that all pairs have to belong to the same establishment in order to control for unobserved firm-specific effects influencing the wage determination process.
Matching more than one nearest neighbor increases the bias, while the variance of the match becomes smaller. In the final version of this paper, we will provide various sensitivity analyses to demonstrate how the number of matches affect bias and variance. Second, we will apply a KM with a normal kernel in the final version of the paper. Considering that comparison observationsthat is all female colleagues of mothers -are numerous in the full sample but asymmetrically distributed across firms-mothers in small firms have fewer potential counterparts whereas mothers in bigger firms are more likely to have more adequate matches -kernel matching is especially helpful because it exploits additional data where it exists but it does not rely on bad matches where close neighbors are not available.
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The intuition behind the propensity score matching is that individuals with the same probability of "participation", that is becoming a mother, can be paired for purpose of comparison.
As a third matching algorithm, we combine the two traditional matching approaches described into one (MATCH 3). In a first step we select exact matches with respect to the establishment, working time and occupation. Obviously the number of untreated counterfactual observations is much bigger than in MATCH 1. In a second step, we use the propensity score determined within MATCH 2 in order to define a comparable control group beyond the pre-matching from step 1. In this case, we confine ourselves to NNM. The advantage of this third procedure is that not only unobserved firm characteristics affecting the wage determination process within the establishment are accommodated, but also unobserved individual heterogeneity affecting the occupational choice and the overall career path.
Wage comparison
Once the control groups are determined, we calculate the difference in the wage rates of mothers and non-mothers at different points in time. As illustrated in Figure 1 , we consider wages right upon return as well as 6 months, 12 months and 24 months after the break. The timing of these dates is determined by the duration of the career interruption of the mother. We compare her wage rate with that of the respective (set of) control colleagues -defined by the matching process in t -1 -who is (are) still working in the same firm. The differences in individual wages determine the average treatment-on-the-treated effect (ATT) of being a mother.
The individual treatment effects, however, may differ across pairs of treated and control women due to heterogeneity in the duration of the employment interruption and other individual characteristics of the mother, such as her education level or firm tenure. Another source of variance may be firm characteristics, such as the branch, number of employees or proportion of female employees. In a regression analysis we therefore investigate the determinants of the difference in the wage rates using duration of the employment break and others characteristics of mothers and their employers as explanatory variables.
Data
The merit of our empirical analysis is significantly nourished by the uniqueness of our data set that allows longitudinal comparisons between mothers and non-mothers within the same firm. We draw on process generated data provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). These
German register data are generated by an integrated notifying procedure for the public health insurance, statutory pension scheme and unemployment insurance which was introduced in 1973.
By law, employers have to provide information to the social security agencies for employees acquiring claims to the social security system. These notifications are required at the beginning and ending of any employment relationship. In addition, employers are obliged to provide an annual report for each employee who is employed on December 31st of each year and covered by social insurance. The reports include information on sex, year of birth, nationality, occupation, qualification and gross wage rate of the employee. Furthermore, each spell includes information on the industry and a unique firm identifier of the establishment where an individual is employed.
According to the obligation to register with the state pension authorities, this data encompasses all persons who have paid contributions to the pension system or who have been covered by the pension system through contributions by the unemployment insurance or by being a parent. As a consequence, certain groups of employees are not covered by the data 4 :
• (Temporary) civil servants or self-employed persons
• Women who are employed in East Germany or abroad.
The latter selection is necessary because the supplementary information on the nature of employment breaks is available for women employed in West Germany only. Nevertheless, the sample represents still about 80% of all German women on the labor market.
We use two different samples of these register data. The first data set is the IAB employment sample together with additional administrative data assembled at the state pension authorities (IAB employment supplement sample I). 5 Both data sets can be linked by the social security number.
The matched file contains a 1% random sample of the total German population having been gainfully employed at least for one day between 1975 and 1995 (for details see Bender, Haas, and Klose 2000) . Based on the supplement sample, we have exact information about the individuals' entire working lives that allows us to distinguish between different types of "non-working" periods, namely, unemployment, formal parental leave, illness, disability, care for other people, full-time education, military or civil service and other out-of-the-labor-force spells. Furthermore, this data allows us to identify the fertility history of all women. Since the birth of children increases the pension entitlement of the mother, IAB employment supplement sample I provides exact information about the number of children as well as the month of birth. Due to the nature of the data we do not have any information on the household background, such as the household income, the partner's employment status etc..
5
For first descriptive analyses with these data see Prinz (1997) , for an analysis of the wage penalties of heterogeneous employment biographies see Beblo and Wolf (2002) and for the effects of entry into motherhood on women's employment dynamics see Bender, Kohlmann and Lang (2003) .
Based on the exact information about fertility and employment history, we select our treatment group, that is women who have given birth to their first child in 1993 or 1994. Since we are interested in the wage effects of parental leave periods, we further restrict the sample to women who have been working ten months and 22 months before the birth of their first child and, after the employment break, returned to the same firm for at least three months within our observation period, that is until 1999. After this selection, we remain with 1,149 observations of mothers.
As described in Section 2.3, the innovation of our analysis is to measure the backlog of mothers'
wages by comparing mothers' and non-mothers' wages within the same firm. Hence, the control group has to be drawn from a sample of all colleagues of these 1,149 mothers selected in the first step. To do so, we make use of the so-called Employment Statistics Register, which includes information about the total population of all people who are registered in the social security system. The following procedure describes our strategy to identify all female colleagues of our treatment group, that is, women who became mothers in 1993 or 1994 and were employed before and after their parental leave spell:
1. We identify the treatment group in the Employment Statistics Register.
2. We identify the unique firm number of every observation in the treatment group.
3. We select all women, who were employed in t -1 and t 1 (or t 2 or t 3 or t 4 ) in the identified firms.
After this selection, we end up with a data set of 370,428 observations of potential control women.
Since mothers in small firms are likely to have only few female colleagues whereas mothers in big firm tend to have more female colleagues, the number of potential control observations per treated observation is very unequally distributed (see Table 1 ). While 5.6 % of all treated observations have only 1 control observation, we identify 7,983 potential control observations for one specific mother. According to Table 1 about 74 % of the treatment group is employed in firms where we can identify at least 10 potential control observations. Because of this ratio between mothers and potential control persons in the same firm we expect not to get a comparable female colleague for each mother.
When we further restrict our sample to women in full-time employment one year after the mothers' return to the job (in t 3 ), we end up with 347 mothers and 229,669 female colleagues, for whom we have information on wages after the employment break as well as wages and individual characteristics 22 months before birth. 
Matching
To perform the second and third matching procedure, a distance metric for the propensity of entering motherhood is required. In Table 2 , the estimation results of a Probit estimation of the likelihood of becoming a mother at time t conditional on individual characteristics at time t-1 are presented. Due to the lack of data, no information on the household background such as household composition, partner's employment status and earnings etc. can be considered. Age enters the equation with a linear and a quadratic term, both of which are statistically significant. Women without an apprenticeship training certificate have a lower probability of having a child in two years than skilled employees. This likelihood is greatest for college and university graduates. The wage rate is negatively related to future motherhood. Married women are more likely to become mothers whereas those working part time are less likely. The negative coefficient for the part time dummy may be explained by our selection of the sample as we only study first births. Hence, most part timers are women who have a child already and serve as a control person. Table 2 . Source: Sample of 1149 mothers (child birth in 1993 or 1994) and 370,428 female colleagues, drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement sample I, Employment statistics register. Source: Sample of 1149 mothers (child birth in 1993 or 1994) and 370,428 female colleagues, drawn from the IAB employment sample, IAB employment supplement sample I and Employment statistics register. 1 DM (German mark) equals 0.51 euro. Table 3 compares the mean characteristics of the selected mothers and their alternative control groups before treatment, that is at time t -1 , 10 months before conception. Note that the numbers of observations in the group of mothers and non-mothers differ between the different matching approaches. While the exact matching provides 6,638 control observations for 176 mothers, over whom sample averages are calculated, the two nearest neighbor matching procedures select control persons for 347 mothers. Due to the strict matching criterion in MATCH 1, based on occupation, age, education and before break gross earnings, we find appropriate control observations for only 176 mothers-to-be.
With respect to the daily wage rate, MATCH 1 and 3 seem to perform better than MATCH 2. A somewhat striking result is that the mean daily wage rates of mothers and controls are higher in MATCH 1 then in MATCH 2 or 3. One reason may be that it is more likely to find an exact comparison observation for mothers in big firms. Hence, pairs in MATCH 1 presumably work in bigger firms than pairs in MATCH 2 or 3. Due to firm size wage differentials, MATCH 1 pairs earn higher wages on average.
With respect to the other characteristics, such as age, education level or occupation, the superiority of any of the matching algorithms is not obvious. To get an idea of the quality of the three matching procedures, we apply different tests. One way to evaluate the performance of the match is to calculate the mean standardized bias (MSB) among the covariates of mothers-to-be and nonmothers 22 months before birth (that is, at time t -1 ). This measure is given by the absolute difference in means divided by the square root of the average of the two associated variances and multiplied by 100. Taking the average of all variables yields an indicator that is decreasing with the match quality. The standardized bias can be interpreted as bias in percent of the average standard deviation. Since there is no fixed threshold saying whether the applied matching procedure is doing well or not, we use this indicator to compare the three alternatives amongst themselves (see e.g. Lechner, 2002) . To generate a comparable measure for all three matching algorithms, we refer to all variables used to model the probability of treatment at time t -1 (see Table 2 ). The MSB amounts to 3.15 for MATCH 1, which represents the relatively best performance. MATCH 2 and MATCH 3 perform much worse with MSB of 9.15 and 8.61
respectively. These substantial differences might be due to the fact that the exact matching approach already involves some kind of match quality control, because mothers without an exact match are not taken into consideration.
One way to test whether controlling for observable characteristics is sufficient to make treated and untreated person comparable -or whether selection on unobserved characteristics matter is to regress the outcome variable before treatment (in our case the daily wage rate at time t -1 ) on the future treatment. If future motherhood has a significant impact on the wage rate even 22 months before entering motherhood, we can conclude that selection on unobservable characteristics matters. For MATCH 1 and MATCH 3, the estimation results indicate that selection on unobservables may be ignored, because mothers-to-be and non-mothers are sufficiently equal at time t -1 (i.e. treatment is not significantly related to the wage rate). In contrast to this, the control women selected by MATCH 2 earn significantly lower wages, on average, than the respective mothers-to-be. This implies, that pure propensity score matching is not able to sufficiently account for differences in pre-birth wages between mothers and control colleagues. 8 An exact ( pre-)matching on selected variables seems necessary to minimize the selection bias. In particular the comparison within occupations appears to take up at least part of the unobserved individual heterogeneity affecting the career path beyond unobserved firm characteristics.
Wage effects
As can be seen in Table 4 , the average wages of the mother samples and the respective control samples differ quite remarkably between the full data set and after matching according to procedure 1 or 3. The wage difference before treatment even changes size: in the full data set the control group receives a higher average wage rate than the mothers-to-be whereas in MATCH 1 wages hardly differ and in MATCH 3 the higher wage earners are found among mothers.
Due to data restrictions, we decide to evaluate the wage effects of temporary labor market dropouts due to motherhood one year after the mother's return to her job. 9 For the time being, we furthermore restrict our analysis to full-time employees, because we do not have information about the number of working hours in part time jobs. Part-time employees may be taken into account later on by merging estimated working hours based on other representative micro data (e.g. the German microcensus or the GSOEP). A look at the average wage rates of mothers and their corresponding control colleagues, one year after re-entry into the job, indicates that the posttreatment outcome of mothers is substantially lower compared to their controls. While mothers'
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In this case, the conditional DiD estimator would be more appropriate to evaluate the wage effects of the parental leave periods, under the assumption that the selection on unobservable characteristics is time-invariant (see Fitzenberger and Prey (1999). 9 Since the employer's record on whether an employee changes from full-time to part-time is not mandatory during the year, this type of information is more reliable after a new employment spell has started, that is in general, at the beginning of the next calendar year.
daily wage rates remained fairly constant between t -1 and t 3 or even decreased slightly, the control colleagues' rates increased by about a fifth. The unmatched wage difference between mothers and controls in t 3 amounts to almost 60 DM. The ATTs of the matched pairs differ by the matching procedure applied. The matched gap is 27 DM (MATCH 1), respectively 25 DM (MATCH 2) or 31 DM (MATCH 3) which translates into an average wage cut of about 20 to 25 percent with respect to the control colleague's wage. Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates of a linear regression of the individual wage differences on the mothers' characteristics. The main result is that the longer the interruption the lower the relative wage on return. Furthermore, age and a higher qualification level are positively correlated with the mother's wage rate, hence, negatively correlated with the wage backlog due to motherhood. [Estimation results of the first matching procedure will be displayed and discussed in a later version of the paper.] 
Conclusion
Our preliminary findings point to a substantial wage cut of mothers upon return to their job.
Mothers' wages are not only by 20 to 25 percent lower relative to those of their female colleagues with comparable characteristics 20 months before entering motherhood. Also in absolute terms, the average wage after a maternity break is slightly lower than before even if we confine the comparison to women returning to full time hours. Interestingly, the pre-treatment wages of mothers-to-be are equal or higher than their control groups' once we apply matching procedures.
This finding hints at a positive selection into motherhood with respect to earnings. A first tentative result from the wage regressions is that mothers loose more wage income compared to their female colleagues the later they return to their job. Though this result is rather unsurprising since, among other aspects, longer leaves cause greater skill obsolescence, it has not been confirmed in a withinfirm comparison yet.
We would like to stress that the results presented are still very preliminary and have to be interpreted with caution. We would like to improve the analysis in different respects, concerning mainly the definition of the control group and details of the matching procedures. Our planned extensions comprise particularly:
• Accounting for the individual employment history -including the amount of time actually spent working, the number of breaks within the past five years and tenure within the firm -in the matching procedures. This is meant to provide a better account for selection into motherhood, as mothers-to-be and women who do not plan to have children may proceed differing employment paths from the start of the career.
• Including firm characteristics -such as the branch, number of employees or proportion of female employees -as explanatory variables in the second-step regression to explain firm heterogeneity in the wage effects.
• Including part-time working mothers by using census data (German Microcensus) to predict hours of work by occupation, industry sector, qualification level and possibly other individual characteristics. We will estimate separate equations for each group: full-time working women, women working part-time but more than half of usual full-time hours and women working less than half (since this is the maximum information available in the IAB data sets). We will then use the predicted hours to calculate hourly wage rates.
• Checking statistical significance by calculating bootstrap standard errors.
• Sensitivity analyses on the choice of the matching algorithm: using kernel matching instead of nearest neighbor matching.
• Sensitivity analyses on the choice of the control group: (1) restricting the control group to female colleagues without children, (2) restricting the control group to female colleagues who will not ever enter motherhood (at least until the end of our observation period) and (3) using male colleagues as a control group.
